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The equilibrium framework of circuit theories. 
 
1. The theory of the monetary circuit has ancient origins, which go back to the British Banking 
School of Thomas Tooke and John Fullarton and to the doctrine of real bills. The approach was 
later revived by neoclassical economists, such as Wicksell, Fisher, Robertson, Lindhal and 
Schumpeter, who studied the circuit of money as part of the more general circular flow of income 
and stressed the role of bank credit, but underestimated in some degree the importance of money as 
a financial asset (fully recognised by Keynes).  
     In the last few decades, new circuit theories based on an endogenous supply of money consisting 
in transferable credit rights have been proposed, in a number of distinct versions. Some of them 
have been put forward by post-Keynesian authors, as Nicholas Kaldor and Basil Mooore. Some 
others by non-neoclassical French economists, as Bernard Schmitt, Alain Parguez, François Poulon, 
and by Augusto Graziani in this country.  
     The ultimate aim of these economists was the construction of a macroeconomic model of the 
working of a capitalist system, characterized by an essential role of credit money, by a close 
integration of the monetary and the real dimensions and by a complete independence from any 
market theory of value (though not necessarily from a different theory of value). It was intended to 
provide a reasonable macro-foundation of economic theory. 
     Unfortunately, this ambitious task has been pursued by circuitists in a traditional systemic 
equilibrium framework of social accounting, where all subjective expectations are realized and the 
future is certain. On the equilibrium character and the alleged “heterodoxy” of this theoretical 
approach, see Cavalieri, 1994, 1996 (and, more recently, Zazzaro, 2003).  
 
2. Basic assumptions of the theory of the monetary circuit (Graziani, 1988, 1994) are the 
following: 
a) Money is an interest-bearing claim devoid of any intrinsic value, created on demand by the bank 
system and used as a measure of value and to make payments. It is a convenient medium of 
exchange, which performs important allocative and distributive functions; not a convenient 
financial asset. The creation of money is regarded as a precondition for the production of goods.  
b) Capitalist production presupposes, on a logical ground, the existence of labour, of unproduced 
material means of production and of an “initial” or ex ante finance, required to pay the wage-
bill, provided by credit money, an immaterial, non-observable, ephemeral flow-variable, 
endogenously created and destroyed by the bank system, through scriptural notes. It also implies 
the presence of three different categories of economic agents: firms, banks and wage earners. 
c) Output and employment levels are determined by the joint decisions of firms and banks, 
affected by the rate of interest. By a behavioural assumption, credit is confined to firms or 
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businessmen (capitalists), who use it to pay wages (short-term credit) and to make investments 
(long-term credit). Wage earners have no access to personal loans (a “classist” rule) and do not 
hold liquid balances. 
d) The money market is always in equilibrium, because any demand for credit money is assumed 
to give origin to an endogenous supply of equal amount (a sort of “Say’s Law”, which prevents 
any excess demand for money and any excess supply of goods). The causal order goes from the 
demand for credit money, made by the firms, to its supply, provided in unlimited amount by 
banks (in the institutional framework of a “free banking” system), at the current interest rate, 
unilaterally determined by banks.  
e) For the banking system as a whole, quite independently of its historical stage of development, 
causality goes from bank credit to deposits; not in the other way round (banks are not a “cloak-
room”). 
f) Both firms and families get income flows and make final expenditures. Firms, whose technical 
function is to produce and which are not allowed to selfinance themselves, use the credit 
obtained by the banks as a wage fund, to buy labour services from the families, in an amount 
which depends on the wage rate and the employment level. Families use their wage earnings 
(the wages paid by the firms to their workers and those paid by the banks to their employees) to 
buy both the outputs produced and the debt titles and equities issued by the firms.  
g) With this “final finance”, the firms must ultimately be able to repay the banks, so as “to close” 
the monetary circuit. Credit money will therefore last only for a single period.  
  
3. In such “pure credit economy”, with no foreign exchange and no government deficit, the money 
supply would necessarily have an endogenous nature and could not be controlled by the monetary 
authority.  
 
4. The supply of money in the circuit framework, being of strictly endogenous nature, would not 
be a possible choice parameter for the monetary authority. The monetary policy would therefore 
loose much of its importance. 
 
 
Some critical remarks addressed to monetary circuit theories. 
 
5. Several critiques of the monetary circuit approach have been advanced in the literature. Some of 
them – very few indeed – have come from neoclassical and monetarist economists, who believe in 
in the quantitative theory of money, in the exogenous nature of money supply, in the neutrality of 
money in the long period, in an intrinsic ability of market forces to ensure price stability, in a 
general accessibility to bank credit and in the logical priority of bank deposits with respect to bank 
loans.  
     These critiques did not throw doubts upon the equilibrium framework of circuit theories. They 
were however rejected by circuitists, as ideologically biased descriptions of the working of a 
capitalist economy. 
 
6. Other critiques have a different nature, as they reject the idea of a systemic equilibrium, implicit 
in the circuit approach. That is the basic assumption that all means of payment created in each 
period are completely destroyed at the end of the same period (the equilibrium constraint being the 
scriptural withdrawal of the credit money previously created).  
     Broadly speaking, this point of view is shared by economists of various theoretical tendencies – 
as Messori, Arena, De Vroey, Benetti and Cartelier, and myself – who accept the Marxian concept 
of the circuit of capital, don’t believe in the neutrality of money and recognize the fundamental role 
of credit expansion in a dynamic economy. 
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     These critiques could not be dismissed by the circuitists as “external”, or aprioristic, because 
they came from economic theorists who had not established their reputation working inside the 
mainstream theoretical framework of the neoclassical synthesis. And that, from an ideological point 
of view, could be placed somewhere between the Marxian, the Keynesian and the Schumpeterian 
tradition. 
 
7. Capitalist production obviously requires an initial stock of money (the purchasing power 
capitalists need to buy labour power). But there is no initial stock of money in a credit economy. 
The circuit approach assigns a central position in a monetary economy to the banking system and 
conceives both the demand and the supply of money as flow variables. This theoretical framework 
is in sharp contrast with that used in the Keynesian analysis of money, which runs in terms of both 
flows (of income and payments) and stocks (money balances held for precautionary or speculative 
motives). Circuitism is in no way a particular type of Keynesism. 
     Examples of a correct stock-flow approach are provided by the “revolving fund” nature of the 
finance needed by new investments (the Keynesian “finance motive for holding money”, 
misinterpreted by Graziani as a fund for financing production activities); or by the Godley-Cripps 
model of the monetary economy, in which expenditure flows and stocks of money and other 
financial assets kept as a store of value coexist and are together required to satisfy some accounting 
macroeconomic identities, such as the equality of total income and total expenditure, or of total 
demand and total supply of money. 
     In a circuit approach aimed at describing a circular process of creation, utilization and 
destruction of money, the possibility of using a stock-flow monetary framework – implying that 
every flow comes from somewhere and goes somewhere – thus appears problematic. But out of this 
kind of model, there is no place for a stock demand for money, made for precautionary or 
speculative purposes. 
 
8. Validity of Say’s Law is usually assumed by circuit theorists, as in neoclassical equilibrium 
models (contrary to Marx’s and Keynes’ opinions). Money is regarded as a simple means of 
payment, devoid of direct utility. There are no liquid balances held as a store of value in the 
presence of uncertainty and no real balance effects. The equality of savings and investments at a 
macroeconomic level is taken for granted, as in neoclassical equilibrium models. The fact that the 
financing of investments requires money, not savings, is ignored.  
     Both credit rationing and a liquidity trap are precluded. At any level of the interest rate, the 
supply of credit adapts completely to the demand of credit (therefore the financement of 
investments is no longer a problem for the firms) and economic agents have no reason to hold 
money as a convenient asset.  
     Moreover, in a circuit model there is no room for consumer sovereignty. The demand for goods 
is supply-induced and independent of the price level fixed by the firms by adding a mark-up to their 
average costs (an assumption which makes the integration of money in the theory of production and 
in a general theory of value a difficult task). 
 
9. There is an intrinsic logic in a circuit, which cannot be ignored. A circuit is a closed loop. It has 
no initial and no final point. It must allow for a roundabout moving of a circular flow. Closure 
should therefore be regarded as a necessary preliminary assumption of any circuit theory. Not as a 
simple condition of equilibrium (see Graziani, 1994, 1996). This point is recognized by the 
circuitists of the Dijon school (Schmitt, Sadigh) and by Messori and Zazzaro in their paper. 
     In a sequential dynamic equilibrium framework, the closure of the monetary circuit cannot be 
disregarded. It has to be ensured stage by stage. Otherwise there would not be a circuit, but a 
sequence of connected open loops, each of which would end in disequilibrium, with an increasing 
indebtment of the firms towards the banks. A very dangerous state of affairs which would give rise 
to what Harold Minsky has described as an unstable speculative financial position, of explosive 
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nature, implying continuous new indebtment by the firms, to cover their previously accumulated 
debt. Under such conditions of structural disequilibrium, the dynamics of firms indebtment would 
be completely out of control. 
  
10.  The result would be the “production of debts by means of debts”, an unstable financial situation 
implying a continuous insolvence by the firms, regarded as an integrated sector, with respect to the  
bank system. With possible failures of single firms and single banks (the case studied by Messori 
and Zazzaro), but no final breakdown of the economy.  
      We would thus be in the presence of an abnormal and illogical structural disequilibrium 
situation, where some firms could make a profit in money form, and so get a possible source for 
self-financing and interest payment, if at the same time some other firms were suffering a loss; but 
where the firms as a whole could neither make profits nor pay interests to the banks. Therefore 
either the firms or the banks, though not both of them, could fulfil their expectations. 
     Some attention has thus to be paid also to microeconomic monetary circuits: to their opening, 
their closing and their interrelationships. Circuitists have paid some attention to the opening of the 
monetary circuit. But they have somewhat disregarded its closing and the intermediate phase of the 
circulation of money. By so doing, they seem to have undervalued the importance of some 
behavioural parameters, as the velocity of circulation of money. 
 
11.  Three serious logical difficulties concerning the closure of the monetary circuit arise in such 
context. The first one has important accounting implications. It is related to the need of each firm 
and of the firms as a whole to raise profits and pay interests and dividends in money (not in nature, 
as in a barter economy). This implies for a circuit theory a serious analytical difficulty, as for this 
purpose firms must dispose of an amount of money greater than that created by the banks in the 
form of credit money. Government money, the primary component of the supply of money, is thus 
needed, in addition to credit money. This fact confers to the total supply of money a mixed nature, 
partly exogenous and partly endogenous. The same is true for the supply of monetary base. 
     As noticed by Messori (1984) and now recalled by Messori and Zazzaro, in the absence of an 
exogenous supply of money, the total amount of money that firms may hope to recover by selling 
their products is at most equal to the amount to which they have been financed by the banks. 
 
12.  Credit is a particular exchange relationship, implying a deferred payment. It should not be 
confused with credit money, which is a particular means of payment). The amount of credit cannot 
be expanded indefinitely. It is constrained by bank assets, and more specifically by bank reserves, 
which are a function of bank deposits, and should be repaid.  
     In the real world only short-term credit has to be repaid by the firms at the end of each single 
period. But it may be renewed at its terminal date – for its previous amount, plus past interests – 
even in the absence of newly created means of payments. Long-term credit is usually repaid over 
several periods, with the yields of investments. To avoid a crisis of the whole system, a sequential 
circuit model extending over an infinite time horizon, but suitable to be closed in each single period 
as regards its short-term financing, would thus be needed (as pointed out by Messori, 1988). Under 
such conditions, the short-term debt of the firms would be bearable; but their long-term debt would 
not. 
     To make the payment of interests possible at a macroeconomic level, the presence in the 
economy of another source of money supply, of exogenous nature (fiat money issued by the 
government, to finance a budget deficit), must be postulated. Any other assumption should be 
regarded as an ad hoc, unjustified, analytical hypothesis. 
 
13.  A second logical difficulty of the monetary circuit approach is that, having no theory of the 
determination of relative values, such an approach is unable to explain the origin of a surplus value 
in a capitalistic system. It may show how profit is spent, once formed. But it cannot explain how 
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and why profit comes into existence, how it is physically appropriated and how it is realized in the 
market in money terms. In a circuit model of the economy, profit is necessarily bound to be zero in 
money terms. 
 
14.  A third logical difficulty for the circuit approach arises if one is willing to allow for the 
existence in the pure credit system of a central bank, which will issue money, will make credit 
operations with commercial banks and will act in their regards as a lender of last resort (a function 
which in the real world central banks usually perform under an overdraft system, but that they are 
not obliged to accomplish in an asset-based financial system, where causality is reversed).  
      Government, or fiat, money – when present in the circuit model (as denied by Schmitt, but 
realistically allowed by Graziani) – is assigned a purely supplementing role, being regarded as not 
required for a regular working of the system. Its supply cannot therefore be used as a control 
variable. This is hardly acceptable. The amount of government money limits the supply of credit 
money. The whole credit system stands on the supply of government money. The circuit of credit 
money is only a part of the broader circuit of money, which is itself a part of the more general 
circuit of income.  
     What is in question, here, is the degree of realism of the model. Not the degree of desirability 
which an analyst is prepared to recognize to the present institutional asset of the world (as wrongly 
asserted by Figuera, 2000, p. 151). 
 
15.  In the past, I expressed the opinion that credit money could not be conveniently held as a liquid 
store of value, an inactive balance suited to transfer purchasing power over time (a cause of 
unemployment). That statement has been contended by Graziani (1996), who remarked that if an 
amount of transferable credit money is not directly borrowed from a bank, but is received in 
payment (being a triangular relationship), it may be kept for some time by the recipient as a liquid 
store of wealth, instead of being spent. This is certainly possible, though not convenient. But 
hoarding credit money as a reserve would not be consistent with the equilibrium state of the system, 
which implies the closure of the circuit. Say’s Law would break down. 
 
16.  How fruitful is the circuit approach? In my opinion, a pure credit system of strictly endogenous 
nature, such as that implied by the circuit theory in its highly stylized canonical form, has little 
cognitive and heuristic value. It provides a simple didactic device, suited at best for a first 
approximation analysis of the working of a monetary economy, in the presence of a structurally 
feeble capital market and of a banking system prepared to finance indefinetely the growth of the 
firms.  
 
 
Missing elements: public sector, capital market, financial circulation and speculative activity. 
 
17. Another important issue should be discussed. According to the circuit theory, the institutional 
role of the central bank will have to be limited, if the supposed strict endogeneity of money has to 
be preserved. The monetary authority would therefore be deprived of her traditional power of 
control over the credit system. A power of control which, if actually exerced, would confer to the 
total money supply an exogenous nature.  
     With a purely endogenous supply of money, a restrictive monetary policy would be nonsensical. 
Thus, under such conditions, a less important economic role is assigned to the central bank. 
 
18.  Both government and credit money are money in a narrow sense of the word. But whereas 
government money is always a necessary component of the monetary base, credit money is not. 
This fact makes a substantial difference between these types of money. 
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     In the real world no payment system is able to work without a basis of government money, 
suited to provide a necessary upper limit to credit expansion, which could otherwise be infinite. In 
the absence of such a limit and in the presence of an increasing demand and an accomodating 
supply, credit expansion could go on indefinitely and firms, being not subject to a budgetary 
constraint, would be in the position to finance any desired amount of expenditure.  
 
19. Credit money cannot be created ex nihilo. It presupposes the existence of government money. In 
the real world bank lending is subject to rationing (by bank reserves and bank assets). 
     Credit rationing by bank reserves – an important feature of reality, distinct from simple credit 
constraints self-imposed by the banks – is ignored by circuitists. Yet it changes completely the 
analytical framework of the problem we are considering. Because in the presence of credit 
rationing, the amount of credit money is supply determined, not demand determined. 
 
20.  Unconvertible (non-redeemable) government money is not credit money. It does not represent a 
credit, an interest-bearing claim of the holder and a liability of either the central bank or the 
Treasury. It carries no interest yield. Thus the alleged identity of functions between government 
money (cash, banknotes) and credit money (bank deposits) is far from being a complete one.  
     We can certainly say that all money supply comes from the bank system. But we cannot say that 
all money supply has the nature of credit money. Or that it is “credit driven and demand 
determined” and may be represented with an horizontal line in the price-quantity space. 
 
21.  In our times, the nominal supply of money has an eterogeneous nature. Only a part of it – its 
credit component – is certainly endogenous (demand determined). Government money is partly 
endogenous (inside money) and partly exogenous (outside money, created for the need of financing 
a public deficit). The real supply of money (the nominal supply divided by the price level), on the 
contrary, is always endogenous. 
     Being unconvertible, government money issued by the central bank should no longer be 
considered as credit money, involving an obligation of the issuer (or an obligation of the Treasury). 
It has an exogenous nature. It is not a debt of the central bank. No interest is paid on it.  
 
22.  In the real world, financial options are usually available. Families save part of their incomes 
and choose between leaving their savings inactive or investing them in long-term bonds, corporate 
equities, treasury bills or bank deposits. Firms which need additional liquid funds are in the position 
to choose between looking for bank credit and seeking long-term finance in the capital market. 
Commercial banks decide whether to finance themselves by collecting private savings or through 
the discount window of the central bank; and whether to invest in making loans to their customers 
or to buy financial assets. Deposits make loans and loans make deposits. This is the basic 
framework of the Keynesian analysis of the monetary theory of production.  
     In circuit theories all this is impossible. No distinction is made between the money market and 
the financial market. There is a banking sector, which is supposed capable of financing every level 
of firms’ productive activity. Therefore there is not need of a financial sector (its role being reduced 
to an allocative one for existing liquid resources). A speculative activity in the bond market is thus 
impossible. We are supposed to be in a purely ideal indebtment or credit economy.  
     Under such unnaturally restrictive conditions, there can be no uninvested savings by the families 
and no selfinancing by the firms. Loans make deposits, bur deposits do not make loans. Investment 
decisions are assumed to be completely independent of financial market conditions. Banks do not 
borrow money and do not pay interests. Interests are paid only by the firms, on loans covering the 
cost of investment, to the bank system and to the bond holders. 
 
23.  To allow for a theoretical advancement of the circuit approach, the degree of complexity of this 
stylized model has to be considerably augmented. A capital market and a financial circulation must 
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be explicitely introduced into the monetary theory of production, with the purpose of supplementing 
credit institutions and the industrial circulation of money, which gives rise to current payments. But 
as soon as this is done, the unrealistic and analytically unsatisfactory assumption of a purely credit 
economy, in which firms can finance their productive activities only by bank credit of endogenous 
nature, breaks down. Full interaction of money, credit and finance must be admitted. 
 
24.  In a stock and flow model of the economy, the demand for money will find a satisfactory 
analytical explanation only within the framework of a general theory of portfolio choices, suitable 
to define the equilibrium of the whole capital account. 
     Functional interdependence of supply and demand for money should be recognized. And an 
analytical effort should be made to transform all the relations among single economic agents (firms, 
families, banks, public sector, foreign sector) into a small number of relations among macro 
variables based on consolidated accounts. 
     In a closed economy with a supply of money characterized by the presence of both government 
and credit money, the money balances held by the banking system should equal at any moment the 
difference between bank deposits and bank loans, plus the amount of credit facilities accorded by 
the central bank to commercial banks which has been actually used (Cavalieri, 1999). 
 
25.  For the interaction of demand and supply of money, a bidirectional causal ordering between 
real and monetary variables has to be admitted. There is no unique causal direction moving from the 
demand to the supply of money, as assumed by circuitists.  
     And in any monetary system in which supply of government and credit money coexist, causality 
goes from the former to the latter component of total money supply.  
 
 
On the alleged Marxian and Keynesian connections of the monetary circuit approach. 
 
26. Some authors of Graziani’s group – Bellofiore, Forges Davanzati and Realfonzo (2000) – 
maintain that the Marxian “law of value” (his pure theory of labour value), though unsuited for a 
correct determination of commodities relative prices of production, is applicable to money and is 
consistent with the circuit theory. According to the “new interpretation” of the Marxian 
“transformation problem”, which makes use of constant monetary expressions of labour time, 
instead of labour values, these authors think that the value of money may be coherently expressed 
by the amount of labour force used to produce a unit of net social output, valued at prices of 
production, in money terms. On this premise, the monetary value of the net output produced in the 
system would be proportional to the amount employed of living labour. They feel therefore entitled 
to interpret the circuit theory as a “monetary theory of labour value” suited to measure the 
purchasing power of money in labour terms (or in labour equivalents). On this ground, they claim 
that, at the beginning of the circuit story, it is the value of labour power which determines the value 
of money. And they propose to “enrol” Marx among the precursors of their theory of the monetary 
circuit.  
     In my opinion, this is hardly acceptable. Marx did never say that capitalist production 
presupposes credit creation by banks. He rejected Say’s Law and thought that capitalist production 
presupposed an initial stock of commodity money. Not a stock of paper money, or a simple amount 
of credit money (abstract wealth). Messori and Zazzaro, on the contrary, do not object to the idea of 
ascribing a Marxian origin to the circuit theory (indeed, they recognize Graziani some merit for 
remarking this point). 
 
27. Differently from the circuitists, Marx did not attribute a credit nature to the entire money 
supply. At his times money was in large part commodity money, made of a precious metal 
exogenously supplied. In his theory of money, which combined elements of the metallist and the 
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credit views, the value of commodity money could be expressed in terms of labour embodied, being 
measured by the amount of labour time required to produce and coin the metal. That of credit 
money could not.  
     Unfortunately, Marx himself paved the way to the circuitists’ misunderstanding, as he used to 
speak of credit money also in a second and more general meaning, which regarded as such all the 
money which circulated in a capitalist economy, quite independently of its being commodity money 
(“true money”) or paper money, because in his opinion it expressed the credit right of workers over 
the total product of the system. 
 
28. As concerns the alleged connection between the circuit approach and Keynes’ monetary theory 
of production – claimed by the circuitists and mentioned by Messori and Zazzaro in their paper – let 
me recall three things: (i) that Keynes considered the demand and the supply of money as stock 
relationships; (ii) that Keynes, as Marx, rejected Say’s Law; and (iii) that, contrary to the circuitists, 
Keynes did not assume flow equilibrium in the money market.  
     Circuitism is neither a particular kind of Marxism, nor a special type of Keynesism. 
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